

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AUTHORITARIANISM

Spring 2019

Instructor:	Allison Hartnett	Time:	Thu. 3:30 PM – 5:20 PM
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Populist politics across the globe have prompted widespread alarm as storied democracies drift toward authoritarian politics while long-standing autocracies show signs of retrenchment. Kasparov and Halvorsen note a boom in the authoritarian business, with over half of the world's population living under autocratic rule in 2017.

With the marked rise of authoritarianism, this course will analyze how the political relationships between individuals, institutions and the economy affect (and are affected by) authoritarian rule. The question of transitions from autocracy to democracy has been at the heart of 20th century political science. Recently, however, scholars are making a serious study of non-democratic regimes in their own right, as new data sources and analytical tools shed light on information-scarce authoritarian political systems. Deeply connected to issues such as redistribution, political competition, and institutions, social scientists across the spectrum of economics, sociology, and political science are contributing to this vibrant and growing sub-field.

Students will evaluate theoretical concepts from courses in democratization and the political economy of development in the context of persistent and rising authoritarian rule. They will also have the opportunity to choose a country case in which to gain expertise during the course. At the end of this course, students should be able to:

- Define and identify key elements of authoritarian institutions and politics.
- Critically engage with the variety of arguments and theoretical explanations that social scientists have developed to explain the dynamics of persistent authoritarian rule.
- Identify an important research question in the political economy of authoritarianism.
- Gain expertise in one country case and be able to assess the utility and limitations of these arguments with reference to this case.
- Critically analyze empirical social science research.

Prerequisites:

Intro to Comparative Politics, or any upper level Political Science course. It will also be helpful, although not mandatory, to have taken a course on research design in the Social Sciences.

Course Assignments and Grading:

This course has an intensive reading and writing load; the nature of the assignments are to enable students to engage deeply with the material and come away from the course with a fluency in the comparative politics and political economy concepts and theories that underpin our understanding of authoritarian politics. Your grade will be comprised of four primary components: participation, discussion leadership, critical reading responses, and a larger final writing assignment. The breakdown of each as a component of your overall grade is as follows:

Kasparov, G. and Halvorsen, T. (2017, February 13). Why the rise of authoritarianism is a global catastrophe. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/02/13/why-the-rise-of-authoritarianism-is-a-global-catastrophe/?utm_term=.26a5f19bfa7e

- Participation 15%
 - Discussion Leadership 15%
 - Critical Reading Responses 30%
 - Writing Assignment 40%
- Deadline TBA

Participation: includes class attendance, participating in class and online discussions (including asking clarifying questions). Students will be expected to contribute one question per week for in-class discussion on Moodle (<https://moodle.org/>) by 5 PM on the day before class. Students should come to class having completed all the required reading for the week. Attending and participating in all classes is expected; if you are unable to come to class for any reason, notify me in advance.

Discussion Leadership: Students will be assigned to lead class discussion at least once during the course. Discussion leadership involves designing a discussion outline based on the week's reading which will be presented at the beginning of the class. Outlines should identify the core debates and contributions of the week's readings and provide starting points for the seminar discussion. Students are encouraged to meet with the instructor to discuss your outline in advance of the deadline, which is **5 PM two days before class**.

Critical Reading Responses: Students will submit a 1-2 page single-spaced reflection on the weeks assigned readings for weeks 2-13. These short pieces are intended to check your engagement with the material and help prepare for class discussions. Failure to hand in the reading reflection will be counted as a 0 for that weeks assignment. You are allowed to "skip" your critical response assignment twice during term without penalty. Your critical reading response should also include one paragraph on the evidence supporting or refuting the theories discussed in your response in the context of a single country case study. Students will submit their chosen country case to the instructor by the beginning of class in week 2; this will be the student's assigned country case for the semester.

Final Writing Assignment: All final writing assignments will be double-spaced. Footnotes should be single spaced and the page count does not include bibliography. **Undergraduate** students will have a choice between writing 1) a 15 page research design essay that explains how you would test one of the concepts discussed in class, 2) a 15 page essay that evaluates the evidence for one of the discussed theoretical approaches in the context of your country case, or, 2) designing a board game with a 10 page written rule book that illustrates one of the theories of authoritarian resilience or policy-making. Students must choose which assignment they will complete by week 4 of the course. **Graduate** students must complete a research design essay.

Late Assignments: Late reading responses will not be accepted after their assigned class. All other late assignments will be deducted 5 % for each day that it is late. If you anticipate difficulty with a deadline, please see in me advance.

Required Books:

- Acemoglu, Daren and Robinson, James. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Albertus, Michael. 2015. Autocracy and Redistribution. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Additional readings are listed in the course outline and will be made available on Canvas.

A Note on Academic Integrity: Honest, open inquiry is the foundation of academia, and novel research should be in dialogue with an established body of literature. Acknowledging your interlocutor is key. If you use ideas, text, or data from any source that is not your own, you must cite it. Essays written for this course may not be submitted for another course without the explicit consent of myself and the other instructor. Please visit the university's Writing Center website on using sources and revisit the university's Academic Integrity Policy. The University takes plagiarism infractions seriously, and penalties for students caught plagiarizing include suspension, lowered or failing grades, and possible expulsion.

Diversity and Inclusion: This course should serve the needs of students from all diverse backgrounds and perspectives. I welcome and encourage your suggestions to improve the effectiveness of this course for you personally, as well as for other students. Should our class meetings conflict with a religious observance, please let me know so we can make alternate arrangements. If you have established accommodations with the Resource Office on Disabilities, please communicate those to me at your earliest convenience so we can discuss your needs in this course. In the event of any temporary or permanent physical or mental health conditions that arise during the term, contact campus health to make an appointment.

Course Outline

PART I: FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTS

Week 1: Introduction and Logistics

- Cheibub, Jos, Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice* 143(1):67–101.
- Haber, Stephen. 2006. "Authoritarian Government." In Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Week 2: Foundational Concepts and Researching Authoritarianism

- Geddes, Barbara. 2003. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Chapter 2.
- Linz, Juan J. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Chapters 1 and 2.

Regime Types

- Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. "Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?" *American Economic Review* 99(2): 298–303.
- Geddes, B., Wright, J., and Frantz, E. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics* 12(2): 313–331.
- Reuter, Ora John and Jennifer Gandhi. 2011. "Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties." *British Journal of Political Science* 41(1):83–110.
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Introduction and Chapter 1. *Recommended*.
- Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule." *World Politics* 57(3):421–451. *Recommended*.

Week 3: Origins of Autocracy

- Acemoglu, Daren and Robinson, James. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 5 required, 2-3 recommended.
- Freeman, John R. and Quinn, Dennis P. 2012. “The Economic Origins of Democracy Re-considered.” *American Political Science Review* 106(1): 58–80.
- Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. “The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship.” *American Political Science Review* 84(3): 849–872.
- Moore, Barrington. 1993. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press. *Recommended*.
- Boix, Carles. 2015. *Political Order and Inequality*. New York: Cambridge University Press. *Chapter 2 recommended*.

PART II: INSTITUTIONALISM AND HISTORICAL LEGACIES IN MODERN AUTHORITARIANISM

Week 4: Institutions and Historical Legacies

- Besley, Timothy, and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2008. “Making Autocracy Work.” In Elhanan Helpman, *Institutions and Economic Performance*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mahoney, James and Thelen, Kathleen, eds. 2015. *Advances in Comparative Historical Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press:
 - Levitsky and Way. “Not just what, but when (and how): comparative-historical approaches to authoritarian durability.”
 - Pierson, Paul. “Power and Path Dependence.”
- Pepinsky, Tom. 2014. “The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism.” *British Journal of Political Science* 44(3): 631–653.
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2007. *Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change*. *The Journal of Politics* 69(4): 908–926.
- Tudor, Maya. 2013. *The Promise of Power: the Origins of Democracy in India and Pakistan*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1–2, 6.

PART III: AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE AND COLLAPSE

Week 5: Power-Sharing

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapters 2–3.
- Gehlbach, Scott. 2013. *Formal Models of Domestic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Section 6.5
- Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 123–143.
- Svobik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3–4.
- *Recommended*: Acemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2008. “Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies.” *Review of Economic Studies* 75(4):987–1010.

Week 6: Autocratic Legislatures

- Gehlbach, Scott, and Philip Keefer. “Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures.” *Journal of Politics* 74(2):621–635.
- Reuter, Ora John, and Graeme Robertson. 2014. “Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes.” *Journal of Politics* 77(1): 235–248.
- Wright, Joseph. 2008. “Do Authoritarian Political Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment.” *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2):322–343.

Week 7: Resource Rents and Longevity

- Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.
- Fails, M. and DuBuis, M. 2015. “Resources, Rent Diversification, and the Collapse of Autocratic Regimes.” *Political Research Quarterly* 68(4): 703–715.
- Wright, Frantz, and Geddes. 2015. “Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival.” *British Journal of Political Science* 45(2): 287–306.
- Menaldo, Victor. *The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4 and 7.

PART IV: POLICY-MAKING AND PREFERENCES**Week 8: Clientelism and Corruption**

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Smith, Alastair. 2011. *The Dictators Handbook*. Philadelphia: Perseus Books. Chapters 4–5.
- Hutchcroft, Paul D. “Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder.” *World Politics* 43(3):414–450.
- Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padr i Miquel, Nancy Qian, Yang Yao. 2011. “Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China.” NBER Working Papers 16948, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Malik, A. and Eibl, F. (2016). “The Politics of Partial Liberalization: Cronyism and Non-Tariff Protection in Mubarak’s Egypt.” CSAE Working Paper.

Week 9: Policy-Making

- Hankla, C.R. and Kuthy, D. (2012). “Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes: Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade.” *International Studies Quarterly* 57(3): 492–504.
- Miller, Michael K. 2013. “Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes.” Mimeo, George Washington University.
- Robison, Richard. “Authoritarian States, Capital-Owning Classes, and the Politics of Newly Industrializing Countries: The Case of Indonesia.” *World Politics* 41(1): 42–74.
- Thomson, H. (2017). “Food and Power: Agricultural Policy Under Democracy and Dictatorship.” *Comparative Politics* 60(3): 511–519.

Week 10: Distribution and Redistribution

- Albertus, Michael. 2015. *Autocracy and Redistribution*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1–2, 6.
- Albertus, Slater, and Fenner. 2018. “Coercive Distribution”. *Cambridge Elements: Elements in the Politics of Development*, Melani Cammett and Ben Ross Schneider, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Meltzer, A.H. and Richards, S.F. (1981). “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” *Journal of Political Economy* 89(5): 914–927.
- Tsai, Lily. 2007. “Solidarity Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China.” *American Political Science Review* 101(2):355–372.

PART V: CITIZEN-STATE LINKAGES**Week 11: Individual Preferences**

- Masoud, Tarek. 2014. *Counting Islam: Religion, Class and Elections in Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2, 6–7.
- Shayo, Moses. 2009. “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution.” *American Political Science Review* 103(2): 147–474.
- Tricomi, Elizabeth, et al. 2010. “Neural Evidence for Inequality-Averse Social Preferences.” *Nature* 463: 1089–1092.
- Neundorf, A., Gerschewski, J. and Olar, R.G. 2018. “Inclusionary and Exclusionary Autocracies. How dictators win the hearts and minds of citizens?.” Working Paper.
- *Recommended*
- Neundorf, A. et al. 2017. “The Legacy of Authoritarian Regimes on Citizens Political Attitudes: A global analysis of authoritarian indoctrination, and repression.” Working Paper.

Week 12: Opposition and Protest

- Meirowitz, Adam, and Tucker, Joshua A. 2012. “People Power or a One Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest.” *American Journal of Political Science* 57(2):478–490.
- Robertson, Graeme. 2011. *The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1–2, 6.
- Tertytchnaya, Katerina and Lankina, Tomila. “Electoral Protests and Political Attitudes under Electoral Authoritarianism.” *Journal of Politics*, *Forthcoming*.

Week 13: Democratic Backsliding Post-Third Wave

- Bermeo, Nancy. 2016. “On democratic backsliding.” *Journal of Democracy* 27(1): 5–19.
- Hetherington, Marc and Weiler, Jonathan. 2009. *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3–6, 8.
- Houle, Christian. 2009. “Inequality and democracy: Why inequality harms consolidation but does not affect democratization.” *World Politics* 61(4): 589–622.
- Levitz, Philip, and Grigore Pop-Eleches. 2010. “Why no backsliding? The European Unions impact on democracy and governance before and after accession.” *Comparative Political Studies* 43(4): 457–485.